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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,1
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060006-CA
vs.
PAUL N. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, PAUL N. CHRISTENSEN ("Christensen"), appeals from the
November 30,2005 Sentence, Judgment, and Order for Commitment (Rl33-35), and his
conviction of Assault on a Peace Officer, a class A misdemeanor (Utah Code Ann. §76-5102.4), and Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor (Utah Code Ann. §76-9-102).
Since this is a criminal case not involving a first degree felony, this Court has appellate
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err when it concluded that an individual was
"acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer" (Utah Code Ann. §76-51

Although the plaintiff was originally Salt Lake City, and therefore, it appears the
caption is incorrect, all of the trial transcripts and appellate documents, including the
Notice of Appeal, list the State of Utah as the plaintiff.

102.4(1)), when he was acting within the scope of his private employment as a security
guard?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A district court's interpretation of a statute is a
question of law reviewed for correctness, and this Court affords no deference to the
district court's legal conclusions. State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fl2. "In cases involving
mixed questions of fact and law where the judge makes a determination on contested
facts, [this court] view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling and reversefs] only if the necessary factual findings implicit in the court's ruling
lack sufficient evidentiary support. In reviewing the application of the law to those facts
and findings, [this court applies] a correctness standard and reverse[s] if the legal
standard is not satisfied." State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574-575 (Utah 1991)
(citations omitted). This issue was preserved when Christensen moved for directed
verdict during trial (Rl55:132-38).
ISSUE 2: Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct when it instructed the
jury that the defendant's hallucinating and inability to remember certain details about the
subject events was no defense to the crimes?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's allowance of a prosecutor's
improper statements that are not objected to at trial is reviewed for plain error. State v.
Kell, 2002 UT 19, ^[40. "In determining whether a given statement constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the
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evidence presented at trial." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998).
ISSUE 3: Did Christensen's trial counsel render ineffective assistance that
prejudiced Christensen when they failed (1) to raise a mental illness defense on the
ground that Christensen lacked the requisite intent, and (2) to object to the prosecutor's
statements to the jury that the defendant's mental state was no defense to the crimes?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance is a mixed question of law and fact. An appellate court defers to any findings
from the trial court but reviews any legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Class on,
935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1997).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Christensen was charged by information filed August 1, 2003, with one count of
assault against a health care provider, one count of assault against a peace officer, and one
count of disorderly conduct, two class A misdemeanors and one class C misdemeanor,
respectively (R3-9). A jury trial was conducted on November 30, 2005, after which the
jury convicted Christensen of assault against a peace officer and disorderly conduct, but
acquitted him of assaulting a health care worker (R133-35; 155:199-200).
During the trial and after the State rested, Christensen moved for directed verdict
on the assault charges, which the trial court denied (R155:132-38). Christensen timely
filed his Notice of Appeal on December 26, 2005 (R138-45).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 23, 2003, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Christensen was taken to the
emergency room ("ER") of the Salt Lake L.D.S. Hospital by his mother (Rl 55:55, 80).
During a domestic dispute shortly before his arrival, Christensen's brother had severed
3/4 of an inch of Christensen's left pinky finger with an exacto knife and drenched him
with mace (Rl55:55, 115, 157). When Christensen arrived at the ER, his eyes were
swollen from the mace (R155:144, 158), his finger was dripping blood (R155:108), and
his body and clothing were covered with blood (R155:55, 57, 65, 96, 108).
Christensen was mentally "out of it" and likely in a state of shock (R155:106,
145, 147).2 It was obvious to hospital staff that this was an emergency situation and that
Christensen needed to see a doctor to address his injury (Rl 55:65-6). He also appeared to
hospital medical staff to be psychotic and hallucinating (R155:l 17-18).
Thomas Vu was working part-time for IHC (Rl55:62-3, 86), "doing security
protection for the staff and the patients" (R155:55, 70). IHC is a private corporation
(Rl 55:86). Vu was paid by IHC, and his responsibilities in the scope of that employment
required him to ask people coming into the ER why they were there and if they need help
(Rl55:63, 65, 67, 76, 86). IHC also required Vu to provide security and to have visitors
sign a visiting log (Rl 55:67, 76, 80). Vu also testified that as part of his job with IHC, he

2

Medical shock was defined during trial as "decreased oxygen to the brain as
pumped by the blood
a state of oxygen deprivation." (Rl 55:117).
4

calmed patients down before allowing them to see hospital staff (Rl 55:70).
Vu also worked for the Salt Lake City Police Department on the SWAT team
and on patrol (Rl55:54). Vu testified he was wearing his police uniform when
Christensen came to the ER, and that police officers are authorized to act in their law
enforcement capacities when they are working part-time for private employers (Rl 55:55,
75). However, Vu's specific responsibilities for IHC, for which he was paid by IHC,
were outside the scope of his employment as a police officer (Rl 55:67). Nonetheless, Vu
testified, he was always a police officer and authorized to act in that capacity at all times
(R155:75).
Vu had previously heard on the radio the dispatch report of a domestic violence
incident where a man had his finger cut off and had been sprayed with mace (Rl 55:55).
Vu reported this information to nurse Alan Rigdon, and indicated that the patient may be
coming to the ER (Rl55:94). Vu was sitting in his station next to the registration clerk,
Berthana Drossos, when Christensen arrived (Rl 55:66, 78, 80).
Christensen was loud and yelling at his mother (Rl 55:55, 80) and demanded to
be seen by a doctor (Rl 55:95-96). Christensen's mother testified that he was in shock
and did not know what he was saying (Rl55:147). Drossos testified that after
Christensen and his mother sat down in the waiting area and she approached them with a
consent form and to ask his name, Christensen demanded to see a doctor and was "loud
and belligerent and rude and obnoxious" (R155:81). After Drossos explained the
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necessary procedure, Christensen then gave Drossos his name and birthdate and she
returned to her desk to enter the information into her computer (R155:81-2, 87).
Vu approached Christensen and inquired if he needed to be seen, to which
Christensen responded, "I need to see a doctor, not a f***ing cop" (Rl55:57, 83). Vu
testified that he told Christensen he needed to calm down before Vu could let the doctors
see him, to which Christensen again responded he needed to see a doctor and not a
«f***ing Cop" (R155:57).3 Vu told Christensen that he needed to "clean up [his]
language" before he could see a doctor (Rl55:82).
During the next approximately 15-20 minutes (Rl55:70, 98), Christensen
"continued to yell out... cussing and demanding to be seen" (Rl55:59). Officer Vu
responded to these outbursts by telling Christensen he needed to calm down before his
injury would be evaluated, "for the safety of the staff members" (R155:59). Vu testified
that Christensen responded, "F*** you, you f***ing ***hole" (R155:59). Vu testified
that due to Christensen's size and behavior, and that he was a suspect in a domestic
violence incident, he requested back-up (Rl55:58, 68).
Vu reported the situation to the charge nurse, Alan Rigdon (R155:59).4 Rigdon
testified that Christensen's behavior was aggressive, elevated, and threatening (Rl 55:963

Vu also testified that Christensen told him he was going to kill his brother, the
other party in the domestic violence incident (Rl 55:58).
4

Rigdon testified that he approached Christensen immediately after Christensen
arrived at the ER and while Christensen was going through the registration process
(R155:95).
6

7); and that he threatened he could beat Rigdon up (R155:108). Christensen would then
calm down and listen to Rigdon, but then would get upset and demand to see a doctor
(R155:97). However, Rigdon testified that the ER doctor refused to see Christensen until
he calmed down (Rl55:98). Rigdon described Christensen's behavior as "psychosis",
which condition standing alone warranted medical care (Rl 55:109-10).
While Rigdon tried to calm Christensen, Vu "grabbed [Christensen] by his left
arm to take him under control", not to arrest him or otherwise enforce the law, but
"because he needed to be seen . . . for his hand" (Rl55:60, 77, 99). After Vu grabbed
Christensen's injured arm, Vu and Rigdon both testified that Christensen tried
unsuccessfully to strike Vu with his uninjured right hand (R155:61, 99). Vu and Rigdon
then took Christensen to the ground to take him under control (R155:61).5
In the scuffle, Christensen's elderly mother, who was wearing leg braces, was
also knocked out of her chair onto the ground, breaking bones in her vertebrae
(Rl55:127-28; 146-50). She also testified that after Christensen was knocked to the
ground, one of the officers punched him several times in the kidneys until she yelled at

5

Christensen's mother testified that three uniformed officers took Christensen to
the ground while he passively stood there (R155:146). Drossos' account was also
significantly different from Vu's. She testified for the City that Christensen "took a hit"
from Vu, and then "Vu knocked [Christensen] to the floor" (R155:85). Then, Rigdon
came out and Christensen kept fighting while both Vu and Rigdon tried to subdue him
(Rl55:85). Drossos testified that she may not have seen the entire incident because she
was holding closed the doors leading back to the treatment area to prevent patients from
coming out to see what was going on (R155:90-91).
7

him to stop (R155:148, 154). Christensen's mother testified that she never saw
Christensen strike or otherwise assault anyone (R155:150).
During the 15 minutes prior to Vu grabbing the same arm as Christensen's
injury, Vu testified that Christensen had exhibited no threatening behavior toward Vu
(R155:71-3). Christensen was only swearing and took what Vu described as a "defensive
stand" and clenching his fists (Rl55:71). Rigdon testified that Christensen became
aggressive before Vu grabbed him and threatened to "kick [their] asses'1 (Rl 55:99).
Although Christensen generally remembered the incident including some details,
he was very upset about the prospect of losing hisfinger6and there were many details he
did not remember (Rl55:158-59, 164). He was "pretty crazy" and "into [his] own
situation" (Rl55:159-60). Other than Vu, he did not remember who else was involved in
knocking him to the ground, but knew there were 3-4 people involved (Rl55:160). He
also remembered being hit, kicked, having his legs and hands tied, then being carried
outside and laid on the cement (R155:162). He remembered being surrounded by SWAT
team members while outside and them laughing at him (R155:162).
Once Christensen was on the ground, Christensen continued trying to kick and
hit Vu and Rigdon, so Vu kicked him a couple of times (R155.61, 73, 84, 100, 114). Vu
testified that two other staff members arrived and it took all four of them to subdue
Christensen (Rl 55:61). Trisha Gurney who was one of the two other staff members

6

Christensen testified that he had played the guitar for 35 years (Rl55:158-59).
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testified that Christensen seemed angry and very agitated (Rl 55:124). Christensen was
then placed in handcuffs while he continued to yell obscenities (R155:61-2, 114). Vif s
only intent was to take Christensen under control so he could receive treatment for his
injury (Rl55:74).
After he was handcuffed, Vu testified that Christensen yelled that he "holds the
priesthood power and that God was going to get all [of the individuals who held him
down] within the week" (Rl 55:62). Nurse Rigdon, who had 18 years of experience
working at L.D.S. Hospital (Rl55:92), testified that Christensen continued to be "wild
and crazy in his thoughts and his verbal actions" (Rl 55:100), that Christensen seemed to
be hallucinating (Rl55:117-18), and that persons in shock may react with anger and not
perceive what is going on (R155:106). Medic Trisha Gurney testified that persons w ho
are hallucinating are "not thinking correct"(R155:129).
Christensen was then taken outside and sat on the ground for 20 minutes to at
least an hour (R155:85,101, 114, 155, 163). After sitting outside the ER for a period of
time, Christensen eventually calmed down, was cooperative, and consented to be given a
sedative (R155:102). When asked on direct examination if the time-frame that elapsed
before Christensen was sedated was appropriate, Rigdon testified, "[I]t was, because his
.. behavior had . . . de-escalated, he had become calmer, more rational in that time frame;
but still... ranting and raving, but not as . . . threatening." (R155:l 19) (emphasis added).
Christensen9s injury was not treated by a doctor until 4:45 a.m., almost three
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hours after he arrived at the ER (Rl55:155).
After the City rested, Christiansen's counsel moved for directed verdict on the
assault charges on the ground that the State had failed to prove its case (Rl 55:132).
Relative to the charge of assault against a peace officer, the defense argued that Vu was
not acting within the scope of his authority as required by the controlling statute because
he was employed by IHC and acting within the scope of that employment when the
incident occurred (R155:133). The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the jury
could find that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer because
he was wearing his uniform and was performing "peace officer functions" (R155:138).
During the City's rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor informed the jury
that Christensen's inability to remember the events and evidence that he was hallucinating
was no defense to the charges (R155:197). The jury convicted Christensen on Counts II
and III, assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, a class
C misdemeanor (Rl 55:199-200). Christensen was acquitted of the charge of assault on a
health care provider (Rl 55:199).
After the verdict, Christensen requested immediate sentencing due to the fact
that he had been in custody on the case for over 130 days, and was apparently hoping that
he would not serve much additional time since he did not have a significant criminal
history (R155:201-03). However, the trial court informed Christensen that if he waived
the statutory time for sentencing and a presentence report, there was a "pretty good
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chance" the maximum sentence would be imposed (Rl 55:202). Against the advice of his
counsel, Christensen informed the trial court of his desire for immediate sentencing
(R155.-202).
During sentencing, the trial court noted:
[W]ith respect to possible needs for mental health counseling, I - when I hear
the evidence in this case, it suggests to me that on this evening in question, there
was something wrong, whether it was - you were intoxicated or whether you
were going through some bout of mental illness, I don't know.
(Rl55:205). The trial court then sentenced Christensen to 364 days on the class A and 90
days on the class C, to run concurrent with each other and with credit for time served
(Rl 55:205). Christensen is still incarcerated on this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The trial court's ruling that Vu was acting within the scope of his
authority as a peace officer while he was employed by a private employer as a security
guard is not supported by the evidence and is incorrect. Private employment is
considered a "personalfrolic"under the relevant case law. Moreover, expanding the
meaning of the statute to include private employments will expand governments' civil
liability for torts committed within the scope of those employments.
Point II; The prosecutor's instruction to the jury during closing arguments that
evidence that Christensen was hallucinating was no defense to the charges was incorrect
as a matter of law and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Because the trial court did
not correct this misstatement and Christensen's counsel did not object, and because no
11

other instruction was given relative to the impact of a mental illness on a defendant's
ability to form intent, the jury was improperly influenced by the statement and
Christensen was prejudiced thereby. Further, the trial court's failure to correct the
prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law constituted plain error.
Point III: Christensen's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to raise a mental illness defense and by failing to object to the prosecutor's misstatement
of the law that Christensen's hallucinating at the time of the incident was no defense.
There is no strategic basis for failing to raise a complete defense to the charges, and had
counsel done so, there is more than a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome
in light of the ample evidence that Christensen lacked the requisite mental state.
Also, trial counsels' failure to object to the prosecutor's statement that mental
state is no defense demonstrated a failure to investigate the law, which failure constitutes
objectively deficient performance. This failure prejudiced Christensen because the jury
was likely influenced by the prosecutor's statement, and had it been correct, there is more
than a reasonable probability that Christensen would have been acquitted of all charges.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT VU ACTED WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER LACKED
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AND WAS INCORRECT.
A.

Rules of statutory construction establish that Vu was not acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 provides in pertinent part:
12

Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as
a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
The statutory language at issue here is "acting within the scope of his authority."
Christensen contends that Vu was not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace
officer when he was employed as a private security guard by IHC, nor does the evidence
support afindingthat he was.
"In interpreting any statute, rules of statutory construction require the court to
'first look to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the
language is ambiguous.9" Wagner v. Utah Dept ofHuman Servs., 122 P.3d 599, 602
(Utah 2005) (quoting Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, If 12, 48 P.3d 949. A statute "should
be applied according to its literal wording, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute."
Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, f21 (citations and quotations omitted). "[Statutory
enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful,
and interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or
absurd." Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
The plain language of the statute at issue requires an individual to be acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer before the statute can apply. Giving
effect to the literal meaning of that language, an individual is not acting within the scope
of his authority as a peace officer when he is employed by a private employer and acting
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within the scope of his private employment, i.e., fulfilling his duties to that private
employer, as Vu was in this case. Simply wearing a peace officer uniform does not mean
a person is acting within the scope of her authority as a peace officer. Rather, he or she
must be performing peace officer duties, not private security guard duties.
In this case, Vu was working as a private security guard for IHC within the
scope of that employment when the incident occurred (Rl 55:55, 60, 62-3, 65, 67, 70, 767, 86, 99). Giving full effect to the plain and unambiguous statutory language, a private
security guard fulfilling his employment obligations to his private employer is not acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer; rather, he is acting within the scope of
his employment as a private security guard.
Indeed, Christensen was unable to find any case where a court held that an
officer moonlighting as a private security guard acted within the scope of his authority as
a peace officer, except for one instance in a civil rights case where there was first a clear
showing of police authority and then an arrest. Alvarado v. City ofDodge City, 708 P.2d
174 (Kan. 1985) (holding that an off-duty police officer working as a private security
guard acted under color of state law when he displayed his badge and arrested a suspected
shoplifter). It is noteworthy that in Alvarado, the proverbial shoe was on the other foot as
the municipality vigorously argued that the officer was not acting within the scope of his
authority, and thus not acting under color of state law. Therefore, in light of the potential
ramifications on civil rights cases, it appears it is not in the State's best interest to argue
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that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, or for this Court to
set precedent so finding.
Accordingly, and under a literal reading of the unambiguous terms of the
controlling statute, Vu was not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer,
and Christensen's conviction for Count II should be vacated.
B.

Neither the facts nor the law support the trial court's conclusion that
Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer.

In addition to rules of statutory construction, the Utah Supreme Court has treated
this issue of scope of authority as a mixed question of fact and law, where the evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and "reverse[d] only if the
necessary factualfindingsimplicit in the court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary support.
In reviewing the application of the law to those facts and findings, [this court applies] a
correctness standard and reverse[s] if the legal standard is not satisfied. State v.
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-75.
Also, Christensen had no burden of proof in the district court. Rather, it was the
City's initial burden to show that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a
peace officer when he sought to restrain Christensen so Christensen could, as Vu himself
testified, receive medical treatment for his hand (Rl55:60, 70, 99). Id. at 574.
The Gardiner court further instructed:
In interpreting the language "scope of authority," we find illustrative the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967).
There, it stated that the test is whether an officer is doing what he or she was
15

employed to do or is "engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] own." Id.
Id. Therefore, the trial court in this case applied the wrong legal standard when it found
that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer because he was
wearing his uniform when the incident occurred and because Vu had a duty "whether . . .
he's on shift or not as a peace officer to perform peace officer functions" (R155:138).
However, the trial court did not find that Vu was doing what he was employed to do as a
peace officer when the incident occurred. Hence, the court applied the wrong standard.
Moreover, under the trial court's broad interpretation of the statute, a peace
officer will always be construed as acting within the scope of his authority, and
consequently, acting under color of state law.7 See, Screws v. United States, infra.
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court applied the wrong standard, the
evidence still does not support the court's ruling, nor did the City meet its burden to prove

7

As previously alluded to, there are compelling public policy reasons why
government entities would be adamantly opposed to having an individual who is
moonlighting for a private employer construed as acting within the scope of his authority
as a peace officer. Such a broad construction will increase governments' civil liabilities
for torts committed by officers. See, Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524 (Utah 1944) ("The
United States does not undertake to guarantee the fidelity of any of its officers or agents
in its employ and is not bound or estopped by acts of such officers or agents not within
scope of their authority"); Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180 (Utah 1907) ("A
municipal corporation is liable for the acts of its officers, servants and agents, done within
the scope of their authority, though neither expressly authorized in advance nor
subsequently ratified by it, or as the rule has been otherwise expressed, a city is liable for
the acts of its representatives done bona fide in pursuance of a general authority to act for
the city on the subject to which they relate.") (citation omitted). The legislature could not
have anticipated or intended the increased civil liability that will be imposed against
government entities under the trial court's broad reading of the statute at issue.
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that Vu was acting within the scope of his peace officer authority.
Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, Vu
was a Salt Lake City police officer (Rl55:54) working part-time as a security guard for
L.D.S. Hospital when the incident occurred (Rl55:62-3, 86). Vu testified that he was
listening to dispatch on the radio and wearing his police uniform, and that he reported to
nurse Alan Rigdon that an individual involved in a domestic dispute might be coming to
the ER (Rl 55:55, 94). He further testified that the nature of his law enforcement job was
such that he was always acting in his capacity as a peace officer, even when he was
working for a private employer (Rl55:55, 75). Sometime after Christensen arrived at the
ER, Vu testified that he called for back-up (Rl55:58, 68). Vu also temporarily placed
Christensen in handcuffs (Rl 55:61-2).
On the other hand, Vu was fulfilling his specific duties as a security guard that
were distinct from his peace officer duties (Rl55:55, 63, 65, 67, 70, 76, 86). Moreover,
he was paid by IHC, a private employer, for executing those duties (Rl 55:55, 63, 65, 67,
70, 76, 86). In addition to clerical duties such as helping visitors sign in, as a security
guard employed by IHC, Vu had a duty to help calm people before they were seen by
hospital staff (Rl 55:70). When Christensen arrived at the ER, Vu reported to hospital
staff about Christensen's condition and behavior (R155:58, 68). Notably, Vu's own
stated purpose in restraining Christensen was not to arrest him or to enforce the law, but
to "take [Christensen] under control" . . . "because he needed to be seen . . . for his hand"
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(R155:60,77,99).
Whether or not Vu might perform some similar functions as a peace officer, the
evidence is clear that he was performing the foregoing particular tasks within the scope of
his employment with IHC.
Thus, the City never met its initial burden because it never demonstrated that Vu
was doing what he was employed to do as a peace officer when the incident occurred.
Rather, the evidence unequivocally showed that Vu was doing what he was privately
employed by IHC - not by Salt Lake City - to do.
Therefore, even construing all of the foregoing evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling, it still compels the conclusion that Vu was acting in
his capacity as a security guard for IHC and not within the scope of his authority as a
peace officer when the incident occurred. Vu did not arrest anyone or enforce the law. By
his own testimony, Vu acted to facilitate Christensen's treatment (Rl 55:60, 77, 99).
Based on all of these facts, the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that Vu
was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer.
Moreover, notwithstanding these facts, the law also does not support the trial
court's conclusion. Private employment is universally construed by courts as a "personal
frolic" that removes acts occurring therein from "under the color of state law" and the
scope of peace officer authority.8 See, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 89 L.
8

Unlike this case, the interpretation of "scope of authority" has usually arisen in the
context of on-duty officers who allegedly committed unlawful acts, such as unlawful
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Ed. 1495, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945) ("It is well-settled that the acts of officers in the ambit of
their personal pursuits are not under color of law."); Dry v. City ofDurant, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33330 (10th Cir. 2000) (Unpublished) (same) (holding that uniformed police
officers working as private security guards on an Indian reservation were not acting
within the scope of their authority as peace officers); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295
(holding that 21-year veteran of sheriff s department who was on duty, in uniform, and
was executing a valid search warrant to take a blood sample was acting within the scope
of his authority as a peace officer); State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 616 (Utah App. 1997)
(explaining that a peace officer's actions are within the scope of his authority when they
are "within the course of [his] duties"); see also, United States v. Dombrowsky, 111 Fed.
Appx. 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2004) ("An officer is considered to be engaged in his official
duties and thus protected by the statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, if he is performing the
functions for which he is employed, if he is acting in good faith and in the colorable
performance of his duties, and if he is not on a frolic of his own") (citation and quotation

search and seizure, while engaged in their law enforcement functions. See, e.g., State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22; Am. Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131; State v. Tram, 2002
UT 97. It has rarely arisen in the context of private employment, as here.
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omitted).9
Vu was employed by IHC, not Salt Lake City, to be a security guard. The
evidence proves that he was acting within the scope of that employment and fulfilling his
particular obligations to IHC in that role when the incident occurred. Moreover, Vu's
part-time employment as a security guard for a private employer was a personal "frolic"
outside the scope of his peace officer duties and authority, as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Christensen's conviction for assault on a peace officer should be vacated.
H.

THE CITY'S STATEMENT THAT CHRISTENSEN'S MENTAL STATE
WAS NO DEFENSE TO THE CHARGES WAS PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CORRECT
IT WAS PLAIN ERROR.
A.

Prosecutorial misconduct

During the City's rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor misinformed the
jury that Christensen's inability to remember the events and other evidence of his mental
state, including that he was hallucinating, was no defense to the charges (R155:197).

9

It is not Christensen's position that an officer must be on duty to be acting within
the scope of his authority. An off-duty peace officer can act within the scope of his
authority if hefindshimself in an emergency situation where enforcement of the law is
necessary. See, Alvarado v. City ofDodge City, supra (holding that an off-duty police
officer working as a private security guard acted under color of state law when he
displayed his badge and arrested a suspected shoplifter). However, if he is performing
duties for a private employer, he is not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace
officer. See, Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445
Mass. 745, 752 (Mass. 2006) ("[P]rivately employed security guards engage in functions
that are different from those performed by ordinary police officers").
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This statement was incorrect as a matter of law. See, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305.10
There was persuasive evidence - even from the State's own witnesses - that
Christensen was suffering from medical shock, psychosis or other mental illness,
including hallucinations (R155:55, 57, 65, 96, 100, 106, 108-10, 117-19, 129, 145, 147,
158-60,164), thereby negating his ability to form intent or to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct. Even the trial court believed that Christensen was suffering from a mental
illness at the time of the incident based on the evidence (11155:205).'l
Christensen arrived at the ER immediately after a significant portion of his left
pinky finger had been completely severed and after he had been "drenched" with mace
(Rl55:55, 115, 144, 157-58). He had already lost enough blood that it covered his body
and clothing (Rl 55:55, 57, 65, 96, 108). His injury continued to bleed at a steady, if not
life-threatening, rate (R155:108). He was likely in shock (R155:106, 145, 147). His
irrational behavior was also indicative of psychosis (Rl 55:62, 100, 109-10, 117-19, 124)
- which mental illness hospital staff recognized and would have treated him for
notwithstanding his physical injury (Rl55:109-10, 129).

10

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305(1) and (4) provide in pertinent part: "It is a defense to
a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.... 'Mental
illness' means a mental disease or defect that substantially impairs a person's mental,
emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be . . . the result of injury .. .'n
u

The trial court also mentioned that perhaps Christensen was intoxicated, but there
was no evidence of intoxication. In any event, the court recognized that there appeared to
be something wrong with Christensen that affected his mental state.
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Christensen, who was frantic to see a doctor (R155:57, 59, 83, 95-8, 159-60),
was told repeatedly that he could not see a doctor until he calmed down (Rl 55:57, 59,
82), likely increasing Christensen's anxiety and exacerbating the psychosis. Thomas Vu
then "grabbed" the injured arm (R155:60, 77, 99) of a man the City's own witnesses
testified was psychotic, hallucinating, and "not thinking correct" (R155:129), then had
him charged with assault when the psychotic patient purportedly reacted (R155:61, 99).
In light of these facts, one cannot help but wonder what Vu and hospital staff
expected to happen when Christensen was grabbed by his injured arm. There is
something fundamentally wrong with the fact that a person seeking medical help who was
obviously suffering from shock, psychosis, hallucinations and a significant physical injury
was charged with assault after he reacted to the same arm as his injury being grabbed,
then knocked to the floor and savagely kicked and punched.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305 expressly recognizes that a person suffering from
mental illness may lack the mental state to form the requisite intent under any criminal
statute or ordinance. The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that certain mental
states may negate a defendant's criminal responsibility. Panico v. United States. 375 U.S.
29, 30 (1963) (holding that defendant who was diagnosed with schizophrenia after being
held in criminal contempt was entitled to a hearing to determine whether he had any
criminal responsibility for his actions); see also, Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo.
1985) ("Mental illness or deficiency is an affirmative defense which relieves an accused
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of responsibility for the crime he committed").
In Utah, an injury-induced or other mental illness is an affirmative defense
"under any statute or ordinance" if the nature of it is such that the defendant "lacked the
mental state required as an element of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. §76-2305(1) and (4)(a). Thus, this statutory defense applies to both general intent crimes, such
as assault and disorderly conduct, and specific intent crimes, such as assault on a peace
officer or health care worker. If the evidence proves that a defendant suffered from a
mental illness such that he "lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged" (Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305(l)(a)), it "establishes] that a defendant lacked the
mens rea required by a particular crime." State v. De Plonty, 749 P.2d 621, 626 (Utah
1987) (discussing both insanity and diminished capacity defenses).
Therefore, the City prosecutor misstated the law and thereby misled the jury
when she instructed them that Christensen's mental state, including hallucinations, was
no defense to the charges.
The prosecutor's duty "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Utah law
has long recognized that a criminal trial is ostensibly a search for the truth, rather than a
mere contest between the defense and prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7
(Utah 1993); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d
218, 224 (Utah 1980).
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In State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, the court explained that the
special role of the prosecutor does not call for overreaching, but requires constant
vigilance for fairness. The court stated,
"[P]rosecutors have duties that rise above those of privately employed
attorneys. [They must]... eschew all improper tactics. ...[A prosecuting
attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."
Id. at 961 (citations omitted).
A defendant's right to due process of law is violated if a prosecutor's comments
taint the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 168,181 (1986).12 Moreover, a claim for prosecutorial misconduct must be analyzed

l2

Article I §§ 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution provide due process of law and the
right to a fair trial, as does Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Article I § 7, the due process
provision, has been interpreted to require exclusion of unreliable evidence which is likely
to be unduly impressive to jurors, see, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and as
requiring an inquiry into the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see generally
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Article I § 12 provides the
general procedural and substantive rights of criminal defendants to insure the
fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. See, generally, State v. Anderson, 612
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). When a prosecutor's arguments draw the jurors' attention away
from the merits of the case, such as occurred here, they call into question the reliability
and fairness of the proceedings, and these provisions are implicated.
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on its facts in a manner mindful of the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)("[A]ppeals to passion
and prejudice may so poison the minds of the jurors even in a strong case that an accused
may be deprived of a fair trial.... [EJach case necessarily turns on its own facts.").
Christensen must demonstrate that the prosecutor's remarks in this case "(1)
called to the jury's attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in
reaching their verdict, and (2) under the circumstances, the jury was probably influenced
by the remarks." State v. Noall, 2004 UT App. 441, ^2 (quoting State v. Stevenson, 884
P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994); see also, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)
(same). A prosecutor's improper remarks are viewed in light of the totality of the
evidence presented. State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah App. 1998) (finding no
prejudice where the trial court corrected a prosecutor's misstatement of the law).
Misstatements of the law are certainly improper, prejudicial, and violate Troy.
Id. The Troy Court explained the prejudice analysis in the context of the totality of the
evidence as follows:
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not
be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof, this
Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the jurors is
based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly
influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be
especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be
sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far
as possible, any reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering.
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Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted).
Once prosecutorial misconduct is established, it is the State's burden to show
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and
n.21 (Utah 1986). Further, all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the
defendant. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114,1116 (Utah 1977).13
In this case, as amply demonstrated above, the prosecutor misstated the law
when she instructed the jury that Christensen's mental state was no defense to the
charges. Not only is mental illness an affirmative defense to the charges, but there was so
much persuasive evidence that Christensen was suffering from a mental illness at the time
of the incident that even the trial court was persuaded "there was something wrong"
(R155:205). Accordingly, the prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law called the jury's
attention to matters it was not justified in considering during its deliberations.
Further, Christensen was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper statement
because there was persuasive evidence that Christensen lacked the requisite mental state
and because no other instruction regarding the affect of mental illness on a defendant's
ability to form intent was given.
Indeed, the only instruction the jury was given relative to this issue was the
prosecutor's erroneous one. Given the City's own evidence that Christensen was

13

More recent opinionsfromthe Utah Supreme Court have stated differing
standards. See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)(a defendant must show that
the results would likely have been more favorable in the absence of the misconduct).
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irrational, in medical shock and suffering from psychosis and hallucinations, the jury
likely would have found that Christensen lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes
had they been properly instructed. Therefore, it is more than probable that the jury was
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's statement, Christensen was prejudiced thereby
and it was not harmless.
B.

Plain error.

The trial court's failure to correct the prosecutor's statement was plain error. "To
prevail under plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate three elements. First, he
must establish that an error did in fact occur. Second, he must establish that the error
should have been obvious to the trial court. Third, the defendant must establish that the
error was harmful, i.e., that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would have enjoyed a
more favorable outcome absent the error." State v. King, 2006 UT 3 (citations and
quotations omitted).
The fact that an error occurred is conclusively established by the law set forth
above demonstrating that mental illness is a recognized statutory affirmative defense.
This error not only should have been obvious to the trial court because it contradicted
established law, but the trial court was persuaded that Christensen was suffering from a
mental illness at the time of the incident (Rl 55:205). Therefore, this error should have
been obvious to the trial court.
Finally, Christensen has already argued that the jury was more than probably
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influenced by the prosecutor's misconduct, particularly in light of the fact that there was
no formal jury instruction on the issue and persuasive evidence to support a mental illness
defense. Thus, the error was harmful. There is more than a reasonable likelihood that the
outcome would have been more favorable to Christensen had the jury been properly
instructed, particularly in light of the persuasive evidence that even the City presented of
Christensen's mental illness.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's failure to correct the prosecutor's
misconduct by properly instructing the jury was plain error.
HI.

CHRISTENSEN'S COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.
Christensen's counsel rendered ineffective assistance (1) by failing to argue that

Christensen's mental state at the time of the incident negated his intent and was,
therefore, a complete affirmative defense to the charges, and (2) by failing to object to the
prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law that mental state was no defense.
It is Christensen's burden to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance such that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable
standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient performance was
prejudicial to Christensen. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
The first prong of this standard requires Christensen to overcome the "strong
presumption that counsel's performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable
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professional assistance' and that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy."5 State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994).
The second or prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires
proof of a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively
deficient performance. See e.g. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988); see also,
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1994) (explaining that a "reasonable probability"of a
different result is such that it "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial"
(citation omitted)).
When there is no conceivable strategic basis for counsel's performance,
objectively deficient performance is established. See, State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648 (Utah
Ct. App. 2003) (counsel's failure to request dismissal of a concealed weapons charge
after State failed to produce evidence was ineffective assistance); State v. Gallegos, 967
P.2d 973, 976 (Utah 1998) (trial counsel's failure to renew suppression motion
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App.
1993) (reversing two convictions for lewdness involving a child because trial counsel
failed to timely file motion to suppress statements taken in violation of Miranda).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984):
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support
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the limitations on investigation.
Id. at 690-91. In this case, the record establishes both objectively deficient performance
and prejudice.
A.

Failure to raise mental illness defense.

As previously noted, there was ample persuasive evidence - most notably from
the City's own witnesses - that Christensen was hallucinating and suffering from an
injury-induced or -enhanced mental illness when the incident occurred and that he lacked
the requisite mental state as to each charge (Rl55:62, 100, 106, 109-10, 117-19, 124, 129,
145, 147). Even the trial court was persuaded by the evidence that Christensen was
suffering from a mental illness (Rl55:205).
Because mental illness, particularly the type that would cause hallucinations, is a
complete affirmative defense "under any statute or ordinance" if the evidence
demonstrates that the defendant lacked a mental state that is an element of the offense
(Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305 (l)(a)), there is no conceivable strategic basis for trial
counsels' failure to raise it in this case.
"Attorneys have an obligation to explore all readily available sources of
evidence that might benefit their clients." Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 693-694 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate
and present evidence that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia "that caused him to
hallucinate and suffer from delusions of paranoia"); see also, State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d
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643, 645 (Utah 1982) (explaining that "the trier of fact should have the benefit of
whatever evidence bears on the intent of a defendant when a specific intent or purpose is
an element of the crime"). Thus, a trier of fact should be presented with evidence and be
properly instructed when there is persuasive evidence that the defendant suffered from a
mental illness that impaired his ability to form any intent, such as here.
The evidence in this case was that Christensen was in shock, hallucinating,
irrational, and psychotic (see supra). After a time, the evidence proves that these
symptoms began to subside and Christensen gradually became more "rational" and calm
R155:102, 119), strongly indicating that Christensen suffered from an injury-induced
mental illness. The fact that Christensen was initially irrational, as the City's witnesses
testified (R155:102:119), suggests that Christensen lacked the ability to reason when he
arrived at the ER and for a significant period of time thereafter. It is difficult to conceive
of a situation where a defendant would be less capable of forming criminal intent. In
light of this evidence, there is no conceivable strategic basis for trial counsel's failure to
raise this defense, and their failure to do so constitutes objectively deficient performance.
Christensen must also show that but for counsels' error, there is a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different. State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060,
1062 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Verde, 170 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989). Had counsel
raised a mental illness defense pursuant to §76-2-305, the jury would have considered the
persuasive evidence that Christensen was suffering from a mental illness and lacked the
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mental state that was a necessary element to the offenses. Because that defense was not
raised, the jury was left with the prosecutor's statement that Christensen's mental state
was no defense to the charges. Thus, trial counsels' failure prejudiced Christensen.
B.

Failure to object to prosecutor's misstatement of law.

Christensen's trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to object when the
prosecutor told the jury that Christensen's mental state, including evidence that he was
hallucinating, was no defense to the charges in this case (R155:197).
As previously demonstrated, the prosecutor's statement was incorrect as a matter
of law. An attorney's failure to understand the law constitutes objectively deficient
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. ay 690-91 (explaining that failure to
investigate the facts and law constitutes objectively deficient performance).
Christensen was prejudiced by his counsels' deficient performance because, as
previously argued, there is more than a reasonable probability that the jury was influenced
by the prosecutor's misstatement of the law, such that there is more than a reasonable
probability of a different outcome had the error not been made.
Accordingly, trial counsels' failure to object to the prosecutor's statement
violated Christensen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Christensen respectfully requests this Court to vacate
his convictions.
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